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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a framework to integrate the identity of legislators in a politico-
economic analysis of parliamentary oversight. Legislators decide about the eﬀort they invest
in oversight activities depending on their individual control costs and the level of electoral
competition. We focus on public servants elected to parliament who face a conflict of inter-
ests but also have lower control costs due to their experience and information advantage. If
held accountable, oversight becomes a relatively attractive activity for them to win votes.
For German Laender, we find that the fraction of public servants in parliament is positively
related to the number of submitted parliamentary interpellations. This result holds when
instrumenting the fraction of public servants in parliament with its institutional determi-
nants. Moreover, a mixed-member electoral system as well as a tighter race between the
two biggest parties is related to more, a larger number of parties in parliament to less minor
interpellations.
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1 Introduction
The oversight of the government and the subordinate public service is one of the constitutional
core duties of the members of parliament in a democracy. It is a key aspect of the checks and
balances in a system adhering to the principle of the separation of powers. Parliamentary over-
sight is instituted to restrict the abuse of government authority and to maintain incentives to
eﬃciently provide public goods and services. For its constitutional mandate, the parliament has
access to various instruments, such as the power to pass the budget, the installation of commit-
tees of inquiriy and the submission of parliamentary interpellations. Even though economists
and political scientists alike emphasize the importance of legislative oversight to hold govern-
ments accountable, it is more often than not abstracted from the actual parliamentary control
process in scientific work.1
In this paper, we intend to contribute to a better understanding of the parliamentary over-
sight process in three directions. First, we explicitly study the use of parliamentary control
instruments. Second, we consider parliamentary control as the result of political selection and
of the institutional structure determining political competition. Third, with regard to political
selection, we focus on the role of public servants as legislators in parliamentary control.2 We
understand political selection as the process and the result of any systematic eﬀect of institutions
on the composition of political bodies. As to parliamentary control, political selection aﬀects the
composition of the legislature in terms of its members’ individual control costs and individual
motivation. The two aspects are diﬃcult to separate though. The cost of control eﬀorts can
be lower due to skills, knowledge, an information advantage or a specific motivation to control
(e.g., due to public service motivation or civic duty, etc.).
We argue that the selection of public servants into legislatures is of particular interest for under-
standing how political selection aﬀects parliamentary oversight. First, parliaments across the
world diﬀer widely in the fraction of (former) public servants in their compositional structure.
In the United States or the United Kingdom, there are relatively few former public servants in
the national parliament as they are ineligible to run for a seat. In contrast, in the legislatures
of Denmark, Austria or Germany, for example, the share of public servants has often reached
more than forty percent since World War II. Second, public servants might systematically diﬀer
in terms of their individual cost and motivation for parliamentary control. On the one hand,
1For our purpose, we use the terms parliamentary control, oversight, and monitoring inter-
changeably. For descriptions of oversight see, e.g., Rosenthal (1981) and Patzelt (2005).
2As to public servants, we include all employees that receive public pay and have a work
contract under public law; i.e., for example, educational professionals such as teachers or uni-
versity professors, public servants or employees in the public administration, and members of
the judiciary or the police.
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the selection of public servants to the legislature can serve as a check. If the information asym-
metry between the public service and the legislature is severe (as, e.g., pointed out by Niskanen
1971), electing insiders to parliament who become accountable to the electorate might help to
align interests between principals and agents. Public servants in parliament who dispose of an
information advantage with respect to public service issues and who face lower control costs en-
hance the monitoring competence of the elected assemblies. On the other hand, public servants
in parliament compromise the principle of the (personal) separation of powers and thus face a
conflict of interests. This is due to their double role as agents in public service and as principals
that supervise the public service in parliament. In sum, it is an open question whether the
specific motivation and individual control costs of public servants in parliament lead to more or
less parliamentary oversight for a given level of political competition. The focus of our analysis
refers to this latter question.
In addition, we lay out a general framework of parliamentary oversight based on the dispersed
literature on this issue. This provides a theoretical rationale for a set of further determinants
taken into account in the empirical analysis. While we mainly treat them as control variables,
we consider them interesting as such.
We empirically study parliamentary oversight for the institutional context of Germany and its
sixteen Laender (as the federal states are called). We do this for mainly two reasons: First,
parliamentary control of the government and its subordinate public service is a main task of the
members of parliament in the German Laender. Most new law is enacted on the federal level
while the Laender have to implement and administer it. Second, members of parliament with
a public sector background are a striking feature of politics in Germany. For instance in 1988,
no less than 61.6 percent of the seats in parliament in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg were held by public
servants.
With respect to the instruments of parliamentary control, we focus on the most widespread
instruments; i.e., major and minor interpellations and oral inquiries.3 By asking for detailed
information and evaluations with regard to the eﬃcient use of public funds, interpellations
critically control government behavior. Information about the use of these control instruments is
publicly available, subject to media attention, and individually attributable. As an illustration,
we refer to the air fare scandal (Du¨sseldorfer Flugaﬀa¨re) of the government of North Rhine-
Westphalia in 1998 to 2000. In February, 1998, a minor interpellation with the title ”Do members
of the government of North Rhine-Westphalia use company jets of the bank WestLB” was
3Depending on the legal framework and the period analyzed, preference may be given to
either the term inquiry or the term interpellation. Since the economic interpretation in our
context is the same, we abstract from such diﬀerences in terminology and rather use the terms
interchangeably.
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submitted and aimed at gaining information on why, when, where to and at whose expense,
members of the government (ab-)used the company jets. The unsatisfactory government reply
contributed to further political and media attention and led to the appointment of a committee
of inquiry investigating the issue in more detail in 1999 - 2000. Johannes Rau (President of North
Rhine-Westphalia at this time and former President of Germany) admitted errors regarding the
conduct in oﬃce and Heinz Schleusser (Finance Minister) resigned due to serious accusation.4
This example shows how interpellations are relevant for the political process and for constituents’
evaluations of a politician’s performance. We take the use of these instruments to be positively
related to the strictness of parliamentary oversight.
For the empirical analysis, a unique time-series cross-sectional data set has been compiled cov-
ering three diﬀerent quantitative measures of parliamentary control, spanning the period from
1946 to 2009. Additionally, we gathered data on the fraction of public servants elected to parlia-
ment and collected information on the electoral system, the form of government, alternations in
(coalition) government, the ideology of government, the margin of victory in electoral races, the
number of parties, the seat share of the Social Democrats, and the length of legislative periods.
We find a positive correlation between the political selection variable; i.e., the fraction of public
servants in parliament, and the number of parliamentary inquiries submitted. This holds in
particular for minor interpellations; i.e., the main individual control instrument for eﬃciency
control. The result is confirmed if we apply an instrumental variable approach instrumenting
the fraction of public servants in parliament with its institutional determinants. The eﬀect
of public servants on the use of minor interpellations seems thereby driven by variation at
the beginning of our observation period and to attenuate in later years. Consistent with our
aggregate findings is qualitative evidence from in-depth analyses of individual-level behavior of
public servants during parliamentary debates by Schrode (1977). He reports that public servants
are more active and more critical regarding government behavior in the parliamentary process
than members from other sectors. This is especially the case in public service matters. In
addition, we find a generally positive level eﬀect of a mixed-member electoral system on the
number of parliamentary inquiries. This eﬀect is, however, identified based on institutional
reforms in only three Laender. In mixed-member electoral systems a fraction of the legislature
is elected through a majoritarian procedure (rather than through a proportional procedure). A
majoritarian procedure is understood to increase political competition as individual candidates
can be held accountable by the electorate.
4The minor interpellation was submitted on February 17, 1998 (parliamentary printed matter
12/2886) and the government replied on April 6, 1998 (parliamentary printed matter 12/2997).
Reporting on the air fare scandal was in all major German newspapers such as the Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, the Su¨ddeutsche Zeitung, Spiegel, and Fokus.
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This study contributes to the research on political selection and on the comparative institutional
analysis of parliamentary control. With regard to the former aspect, related recent empirical
and theoretical work has been conducted by researchers such as Besley (2005), Braendle and
Stutzer (2011), Caselli and Morelli (2004), Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004), Gagliarducci et al.
(2010), Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2012), Galasso and Nannicini (2011), and van Aaken and
Voigt (2011). As to parliamentary oversight, this is related to the (often US-specific) analysis
of oversight relationships and bargaining processes between the bureaucracy and the legislator
(Banks and Weingast 1992, Calvert et al. 1989, Moe 1989, Niskanen 1971, 1975, Ogul and
Rockman 1990, Rosenthal 1981, Weingast and Moran 1983), the (legislative) design of admin-
istrative procedures and ex ante control (Bawn 1995, 1997 and McCubbins et al. 1987), and
the separation of powers (Persson et al. 1997, Grossman and Helpman 2008). Our analysis also
contributes to the limited body of research on the eﬀectiveness of legislators (Grant and Kelly
2008, Padro i Miquel and Snyder 2006 and Shiller 1995), and the German political science liter-
ature dealing with state legislatures and governmental-parliamentary relationships (Holtmann
and Patzelt 2004, Patzelt 2005).
Section 2 presents the main theoretical arguments about the incentives for parliamentary control
with a focus on public servants elected to parliament. Section 3 deals with the German insti-
tutional background. In Section 4, the data sets and the econometric analysis are presented.
Section 5 oﬀers concluding remarks.
2 Theoretical Considerations
The institutional structure shapes the incentives of the members of parliament to execute par-
liamentary oversight. Diﬀerences in motivations and skills influence their ability and individual
costs to eﬀectively control the executive bodies. In this section, we, first, briefly explain the im-
portance of parliamentary oversight for the democratic process. Second, we discuss politicians’
incentives, trade-oﬀs and individual costs when deciding about resources to invest in parlia-
mentary control. This framework is, third, extended to the case of parliamentarians with a
public service background. We consider occupational background as an important determinant
of economic interests and control costs. Fourth, we take into account additional factors aﬀecting
parliamentary oversight.
2.1 Relevance of Parliamentary Oversight
A major constitutional principle in a democracy is the separation of powers sustained by a set
of checks and balances. One primary check that falls within the responsibility of the legislature
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is the control of the government on behalf of the citizens. The oversight function implies first
and foremost the prevention, the detection and the restriction of discretionary executive abuse.
Second, oversight is meant to ensure that policies announced by the government and authorized
by parliament are properly implemented. This involves an eﬃciency control. Finally, oversight
involves the critical examination of government proposals. This is often referred to as political
control with respect to the (partisan) direction in which policies are developed. Overall, there
is the constitutional idea that parliamentary control of the government being institutionalized
by a set of parliamentary oversight instruments ensures a responsive government and thus an
eﬃcient provision of services by the subordinate public agencies.
2.2 Incentives for Parliamentary Oversight
There are several arguments why legislators have at best moderate incentives to strictly control
government behavior despite their constitutional mandate. First, strict oversight has a strong
public good dimension within the legislature. Monitoring benefits the whole population and
rarely favors single districts or narrowly targeted groups so that it would become individually
attractive (e.g., Weingast 1984). Second, monitoring is largely ineﬀective because the public
ministerial administration has a clear informational advantage regarding the costs of producing
public services (Niskanen 1971). In particular, the lack of organizational structure and staﬀ
resources (Rosenthal 1981) as well as the longer time horizon of public ministerial agencies
create a situation where the administration dominates parliament rather than being seriously
supervised by it. Moreover, parliamentary attention tends to be sporadic and is often motivated
by some scandal calling for control only subsequent to the event (Weingast 1984).
However, there are also incentives encouraging parliamentary oversight. This is taken as self-
evident in the literature on the congressional dominance model (e.g., Calvert et al. 1989, Banks
1989, and Ferejohn and Krehbiel 1987). Politicians can spend time on campaigning, legislating,
services to district constituents, earning outside income and oversight.5 For politicians with the
relevant political expertise, oversight is an activity that helps them to distinguish themselves
from other politicians in the competition for votes. Oversight expertise is acquired during a
political career and in previous or current professions. Monitoring is further stimulated by
media coverage since it is pursued to attract public attention and to increase one’s reputation.
Stricter oversight is also expected if the (local) constituency complains about the public provision
of goods and services. Constituents reduce the information costs of monitoring by reporting to
5For a discussion about outside earnings and absenteeism, see Gagliarducci et al. (2010), for
a discussion of outside earnings and electoral competition, see Becker et al. (2009), and for a
comprehensive overview about politicians’ outside earnings see Diermeier et al. (2005) for the
US Congress and Merlo et al. (2010) for the Italian parliament.
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their representatives. This is particularly relevant if there are well organized interest groups in
the politician’s district that have suﬃcient resources and strong incentives to keep a watchful
eye on public service behavior (Banks and Weingast 1992).
Several of the previous arguments hint at the role of political competition in shaping the individ-
ual politician’s cost-benefit calculus. If competitive pressure is stronger, politicians are expected
to engage more often in oversight activities.
It is self-evident that the diﬀerent arguments are more or less relevant for individual politicians
in shaping their incentives to engage in parliamentary oversight, the individual control costs
being of particular importance. Legislators with better knowledge about the functioning of the
public service and better access to information about the provision of public goods and public
services have relatively lower costs for engaging in parliamentary control.
2.3 Public Servants as Legislators
Public servants in comparison to legislators from the private sector represent a selection of people
in parliament who diﬀer in their incentives, costs and maybe even in their intrinsic motivation
for engaging in parliamentary control.
Cost advantage in parliamentary oversight
Information asymmetries between the public service and the legislature are an obstacle to par-
liamentary oversight. Electing public servants with a high degree of expertise in public service
issues to parliament is expected to attenuate this situation. A first informational advantage
in public service issues consists of specific knowledge about the proper execution of a public
servant’s (previous) function. A second component refers to knowledge about the general func-
tioning of the public service as a whole. This involves familiarity with the eﬃciency control
executed by the public employer and ultimately by the parliament. It also includes knowledge
about the legal status of public servants; i.e., civil service salary law, civil service career law,
and public services law as well as legal and administrative procedures in general.6 Representa-
tives with a public service background can thus execute parliamentary control at comparatively
lower costs. Accordingly, engaging in oversight is relatively attractive for them to promote their
reputation and thus to finally win votes. For example, a parliamentarian with a public service
background is more receptive to his or her constituents’ complaints about the behavior of (local)
public agencies. An informational advantage, first, ensures that the costs of becoming informed
about local public service nuisances are relatively low. Second, the costs of bringing an issue to
6Please note that there are, of course, substantial diﬀerences with respect to (former) public
servants’ knowledge of administrative matters depending on their branch, function and position
within the public service.
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parliament by means of parliamentary control instruments (e.g., interpellations) are relatively
low, as well. A final argument refers to fiduciary duty. It states that a career in public service
(partially) reflects public service motivation (Frank and Lewis 2004, Le Grand 2003). If such
motivation carries over to behavior in political oﬃce, it contributes to a continuous monitoring
of government behavior.7
Conflict of interest in parliamentary oversight
Public servants face a conflict of interest due to their double role in public service and in
parliament. This compromises the personal separation of powers. A large proportion of public
servants in parliament may be interpreted as embodying a strong and direct representation of
public service interests. As a consequence, the public service enjoys more discretion, which
prejudices the eﬃcient provision of public services. The private interests of public servants lead
to slack that is less forcefully counteracted by legislative control when the latter is pursued by
committees that largely consist of public servants.8 This conflict of interest counteracts the cost
advantage in monitoring.
However, other conflicts of interest might be weaker. Public servants in parliament often enjoy
guaranteed reemployment and favorable terms for leave of absence with respect to time and pay.
These institutional privileges render them relatively more independent of special interests. Other
parliamentarians (e.g., employees of large firms, representatives of trade unions or professional
associations and secretaries of parties) may encounter similar or even more favorable conditions
while holding a mandate. However, they have no legal rights to reclaim the conditions; they
depend on the discretion of their (former) superiors and may be bound to a direct equivalent
in terms of interest representation. In contrast to other members of parliament, public servants
can be considered relatively independent from outside pressure and free to dedicate themselves
to parliamentary duties until the end of their political mandate.
2.4 Additional Determinants of Parliamentary Oversight
Electoral systems and individual accountability
A majority voting system and a mixed-member electoral system, where at least some members of
parliament are elected on single seats, provide incentives for individual politicians to distinguish
themselves from other parliamentarians or potential competitors and to build up their reputation
as dutiful members of parliament. Accordingly, more frequent use of parliamentary control
7A fiduciary model of politicians’ behavior is proposed in Besley (2006).
8However, it might be argued that a coordinated behavior of public servants in parliament is
diﬃcult to implement given the heterogeneity of public servants with respect to party aﬃliation,
branch, function and position within the public service.
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instruments is expected relative to a pure proportional electoral system.
Political Parties
Parties and their parliamentary representation, the factions, often have a constitutional duty to
monitor and actively criticize government behavior. Compared to individual legislators, parties
have a longer time horizon (Alesina and Spear 1988). This enhances their interest in sustained
oversight activity. Party leaders provide internal rewards and sanctions to induce individual
members of parliament to engage in oversight (Niskanen 1975). Moreover, (large) parties can
specialize internally (Snyder and Ting 2002) to organize parliamentary control and accumulate
monitoring specific human capital. Whether or not parties are formally allowed to initiate
parliamentary instruments, they can strategically coordinate the use of these individual tools to
put pressure on the executive body.
The extent to which parties engage in parliamentary oversight is aﬀected by the degree of party
competition. The closer electoral races are expected to be, the stronger are the incentives to
engage in oversight.
Related arguments refer to the new parties and the number of parties in parliament and their
role in oversight. First, new parties have to distinguish themselves from the other parties
and need to become known (Kalke and Raschke 2004). Second, new parties are often elected
because of dissatisfaction with the government or with the parties in power. For both reasons,
parliamentarians from new parties are expected to use parliamentary control instruments more
frequently to actively control government behavior than established parties.
Furthermore, the number of parties might reflect the diversity of social interests represented in
parliament. More diversity might be another force that stimulates the execution of oversight.
However, the free rider problem in parliamentary oversight is also more severe with a larger
number of parties (as there is less possibility to attribute political failures to individual actors
and parties).
One might finally conjecture that the ideological composition of parliaments is related to the
engagement in parliamentary control. Anticipating the empirical analysis below, this aspect
creates a statistical problem if a systematic relationship between the ideological and the pro-
fessional composition of parliaments exists. So it is often reported that the fraction of public
servants is higher in the center-left parties.9 We take this into account statistically by including
information on the party composition of parliament.
Form of government
9For the German federal parliament see; e.g., Kintz (2010) who reports a higher share of
public servants in the Social Democratic Party (SPD).
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Parliamentary democracies experience governments that are formed by a single party as well as
coalition governments. These diﬀerent constellations give rise to a large set of strategic consid-
erations when deciding about parliamentary control activity. It is argued that members of the
majority party or coalition parties have little incentive to eﬀectively control their own govern-
mental representatives. According to this argument, the larger the majority or the coalition is,
the less frequently parliamentary control instruments are used. However, the constituency of
the governing majority, for the most part, holds its representatives responsible for the provision
of public goods, who thus have an incentive to control the eﬃcient provision of public services
and to use the respective instruments. This might be particularly hold for political parties for
which the public provision of goods and services is programatic.
It might further be argued that parties in opposition have stronger incentives to execute mon-
itoring when they can distinguish themselves from a large fraction of representatives; e.g., in
situations with coalitions of major parties. Moreover, within coalitions of major parties, over-
sight incentives might be strengthened as these coalitions cover a large ideological spectrum.
Since such constellations are not considered to be permanent, major parties want to signal their
independence by controlling the government, respectively the government representatives of the
coalition partner. In addition, (coalition) governments that formed after an alternation from
center-left to center-right or vice versa might experience a more contested legislative period and
thus more submissions of interpellations. Summing up, no clear theoretical prediction is possible
about how any one form of government is related to the overall level of parliamentary oversight.
Other factors
Some use of parliamentary oversight instruments must be seen as an expression of parliamentary
activism (see, e.g., Andeweg and Irwin 1993) not primarily intended to control the government.
Specific factors driving parliamentary activism are not investigated. However, we expect any
statistical relationship to be weaker in later periods when media-guided parliamentary activism
is stronger. Level eﬀects are expected from larger legislatures and longer legislative periods.
Parliaments entrusted with designing the constitution and establishing the most fundamental
institutions might concentrate on legislating. The necessary implementation of new law might,
however, also provoke more parliamentary oversight.
3 Institutional Background
The theoretical arguments are studied for public servants elected to German Laender parlia-
ments.10 In Germany, the core competencies of the Laender mostly concern public service
10The public service in Germany includes all employees that receive public pay and have a
work contract under public law. We are aware that there are diﬀerences in the legal status
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issues, such as education, cultural aﬀairs, administrative law, police law, and municipal law. An
important competence is also the actual formation of the implementation rules of federal laws
(Ausfu¨hrungsbestimmungen). The latter aspect implies that most sovereign duties are executed
by the public service of the Laender or local authorities. Both of these are subject to the su-
pervision of Laender parliaments. In fact, most of the time and resources of the parliamentary
process at the Laender level (and significantly more than at the federal level) are devoted to
controlling government behavior rather than to legislating (Patzelt 2006).
Parliamentarians in the German Laender have access to diﬀerent instruments to pursue their
oversight mandate in order to hold the government accountable. The major means for obtaining
information and for controlling government and public-service behavior are the power to pass the
budget (Budgethoheit), the institution of committees of inquiry and parliamentary interpellation
rights.11 Some of these instruments are stipulated in the constitution. More commonly, they
are part of the rules that govern parliamentary procedures.
We focus on the parliamentary instruments of inquiry or interpellation. Parliamentary inquiries
oblige the executive body to provide the information or explanation requested (Article 20, para-
graph 2, of the German constitution) and follow a strict enforcement laid down in the procedural
rules. This includes access to documentations, unsolicited assistance, ministerial reports, and
written comments. In addition, government declarations have to accommodate parliamentary
control matters (Reutter 2008).12
The German parliaments generally allow three types of parliamentary inquiry: major and mi-
nor interpellations and oral inquiries. Box A.1 in the Appendix provides procedural details for
their application highlighting the enforcement mechanism if the executive body does not react
between the diﬀerent occupational (sub)categories of the public service (i.e., public servants
(Beamte) or employees in the public service (Angestellte im o¨ﬀentlichen Dienst). However, for
the scope of our analysis, there are no important diﬀerences regarding the conditions to run for
parliament or the conditions of guaranteed reemployment after the termination of a mandate.
Professionals from the public service, typically represented in parliaments, come from professions
in education (i.e., teachers or university professors), are police oﬃcials, magistrates, ministers,
political public servants, (senior-) oﬃcials in various fields of public administration, mayors and
district administrators (Landra¨te) or employees of public enterprises. Privatizations, such as
the major privatizations in the 1990s of Deutsche Post and Deutsche Telekom are taken into
account. In 2005, the fraction of public servants in the working population amounted to 13.3%.
11Further institutions to control government behavior include the right to demand the at-
tendance of members of the government (Ministerzitierung), public auditing institutions (Rech-
nungsho¨fe), specialized oﬃces of ombudspersons (e.g., the commissioner for the armed forces),
petition committees, and the judicial review (Normenkontrollklage) before the German consti-
tutional court. For an overview of the German institutional framwork see Schindler (1999). For
a comparative survey on oversight instruments in national parliaments see Yamamoto (2007).
12For a discussion of parliamentary interpellation instruments see Russo and Wiberg (2010).
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according to the procedural rules. Major and minor interpellations focus on the eﬀective use
of public funds. While major interpellations address issues of broader coverage and contain
questions reaching from constitutional concerns to government’s intentions regarding possible
reforms, minor interpellations aim at narrower issues. They form the classical tool for eﬃciency
control. Parliamentarians use interpellations to collect information and to demand explanations,
justifications and assessments of the conditions that prevail in the various fields of public ser-
vice activity. Moreover, interpellations often deal with the impact of reforms and demand the
government to thoroughly clarify its stance on the measures taken. Apart from questions that
critically examine executive behavior, interpellations also include questions aiming at govern-
ments’ intended policy actions. Typical areas of concern are the judiciary, the police, education,
infrastructure, and the public administration. Oral inquiries are also submitted in order to
collect information and demand explanations. However, they often address current issues and
matters related to news events. An example for a minor interpellation is presented in Box A.2
in the Appendix.
In sum, the procedural rules force governments to react. The enforcement mechanism serves as
a threat of launching a debate or transforming an interpellation into an interpellation of higher
order thereby steering media attention. All aspects aﬃrm the role of interpellations as strong
parliamentary oversight devices.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Data
The empirical analysis is based on a newly collected dataset on the use of parliamentary control
instruments in all the parliaments of the German Laender and city states as well as on the
factors influencing parliamentary oversight. Currently, there are sixteen German states. Up
to the German reunification, there were eleven states, the so-called old German Laender. The
empirical analysis covers the time period since the late 1940s (with a maximum of 63 years for
Bavaria and a minimum of twelve years for the new German Laender).
Parliamentary instruments of inquiry
Data on the aggregate use of interpellations and inquiries is collected from various sources.
For some Laender and some time periods, descriptive studies in political science oﬀer data.13
Additional information is from parliamentary handbooks (Volkshandbu¨cher) and from the par-
liamentary online documentation systems of the Laender. They provide detailed information for
13In particular, we draw on Kalke and Raschke (2004), Mielke and Reutter (2004), Raschke
and Kalke (1994), Reutter (2008), and Scha¨fer (2005).
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recent legislative periods. In order to collect information on early legislative periods, we analyze
parliamentary printed matter or protocols as well as government declarations. These materials
were provided by the parliamentary information services.
For the three instruments, i.e. major and minor interpellations and the oral inquiries, there is
information for 152, 153 and 133 legislative periods respectively. There is no information for
some early legislative periods due to data availability. Some Laender introduced oral inquiries
only in later periods. We take this into account in the empirical analysis as oral inquiries are
likely to have replaced some minor interpellations.
Descriptive statistics for each of the instruments is presented in Table A.1 in the Appendix.
On average, the number of major interpellations submitted within a legislative period is 66.6.
For minor interpellations, the average number is 1663.6, and for oral inquiries, the respective
number is 545.9.
Figure 1 illustrates the raw number of minor interpellations and oral inquiries submitted in all
the German Laender parliaments over time. No systematic pattern is observed; neither over
time nor across Laender.
[Figure 1 about here]
In collecting the data on the three instruments for parliamentary inquiries, we encountered some
challenges. In some cases, contradictory information about the number of submitted inquiries
exists. The number of minor interpellations and oral inquiries varies because some researchers
and oﬃcials count only the number of inquiries that have received replies. In some sources, it is
not taken into account that inquiries not replied to in time can be transformed into higher order
interpellations and that an unexpected termination of a legislative period may cause unanswered
inquiries. As far as we noticed such ambiguities, we clarified the observations in question with
the help of the parliamentary information services.
Explanatory factors
In the main empirical analysis, we take into account a large set of factors that are theoretically
related to parliamentary oversight. We describe the explanatory variables for the largest sample;
i.e., for minor interpellations. Descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix are reported in
Tables A.1 and A.4 in the Appendix.
o Fraction of public servants: This variable captures the percentage of parliamentarians
with a previous or concurrent occupation in the public service. Data is from Braendle
and Stutzer (2010) who coded the occupational type based on the information on the
very last last employment before entering parliament. On average, 40.5 % of the members
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of the Laender parliament have a public sector background. The fraction was lowest in
Lower Saxony (1947); i.e., 10.6 %, and highest in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg (1988); i.e., 61.6%.
The descriptive statistics for the representation of public servants in German Laender
parliaments are reported in Table A.2 in the Appendix.
o Mixed-member electoral system: This variable for the electoral system (based on Massicotte
2003) is coded 1 (0 otherwise) if some candidates are directly elected while others enter
via a party list.14 The reference category is a strictly proportional electoral system. In
2010, 14 Laender apply a mixed-member electoral system. A pure proportional electoral
system is applied in Saar and Bremen. Within our sample period Bavaria, Hesse and
Rhineland-Palatinate have switched from a strictly proportional electoral system to one
with a majoritarian component. No switches in the other direction have been observed.
The relative frequency of a mixed-member electoral system in the data set is 73.9%. As
to the application of the electoral rules in the single German Laender, details are shown
in Table A.3 in the Appendix.
o Margin of victory : Party competition is approximated by the diﬀerence in vote shares
between the strongest party and the closest competitor. The average margin of victory is
11.8%.
o New party : If at least one new party enters parliament in a legislative period, the variable
takes value 1 (0 otherwise). This is the case for roughly one third of the legislative periods
in our sample.
o Number of parties: This variable states the number of parties elected to each legislative
periode. The average number is 3.7.
o Seat share of the SPD : The party composition of parliaments is captured by the seat share
of the Social Democratic Party in each legislative period, which is, on average, 40.8% in
our data set.
14In most Laender with a mixed member electoral system, each voter has two votes, a first
vote and a second vote. The first vote is directly attributed to a candidate who represents the
electoral district (majority voting component). The candidate who obtains the majority of first
votes in the districts is elected to parliament by a direct mandate. With the second vote, the
citizens vote for the party which may then, in accordance with its share of party votes, send
candidates from closed party lists to parliament. This is the proportional voting component in
the electoral system. For a detailed description of the electoral system including the discussion
of bonus seats (U¨berhangmandate), compensatory additional list seats (Ausgleichsmandate) and
further diﬀerences between the Laender, see Massicotte (2003).
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o Coalition government by major parties : The variable for the form of government (based
on Manow and Wettengel 2006) takes value 1 (0 otherwise) if the government is supported
by a coalition of the major parties (CDU, Christian Democratic Party and SPD, Social
Democratic Party). In 14.4% of the legislative periods, the government was composed of
the two major parties.
o Constitutional parliament : Constitutional parliament is given and coded 1 (0 otherwise)
if the parliament is entrusted with designing the constitution. Nine legislative assemblies
are coded as constitutional parliament.
o Oral inquiries exercisable: If the instrument of oral inquiry is introduced separately and
is exercisable, the variable takes value 1 (0 otherwise).
o Legislative period shorter than 1.5 years : If the legislative period turns out to be shorter
than 1.5 years, the variable takes value 1 (0 otherwise).
o Legislative period between 1.5 and 3 years: The variable takes the value 1 (0 otherwise) if
the legislative period turns out to last between 1.5 years and 3 years.
o Legislative period regular 5 years: If the regular legislative period lasts 5 years, the variable
takes value 1 (0 otherwise).
The reference category for the last three variables is the regular 4-year legislative period. In
our data set, regular 4-year legislative periods occured 105 times, regular 5-year periods occured
37 times. Early termination of legislative periods took place eleven times. Out of these eleven
periods, five terminated in less than 1.5 years. The five very short legislative periods are all
characterized by interim governments since potential coalition parties were not able to form a
new government after elections.
Additional variables are taken into account in the robustness analysis: Indicator variables cap-
ture (i) major alternations in government from center-left to center-right or vice versa (ii) coali-
tion governments involving any party and (iii) governments led by the SPD. Another variable
measures party concentration in parliament using a Herfindahl index.
4.2 Results
The results are presented in several steps. We start with an overview of the partial correlations
between the identified determinants and the three parliamentary control instruments. Subse-
quently, we focus our analysis on minor interpellations. Our theoretical considerations fit the
use of this instrument best as minor interpellations are mainly applied for eﬃciency control of
government and public service behavior. We execute several robustness checks for the baseline
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specification and then address two major empirical challenges: First, we take into account the
particular (short) time-series, (small) cross-sectional data structure incorporating dynamics as
proposed by Bruno (2005). Second, in order to meet concerns regarding endogeneity, we apply
an instrumental variable approach.
Baseline estimations
Table 1 presents the first set of results for the full data sample including all three oversight
instruments and observations from the old and the new German Laender based on the following
equation:
ln(no. of interpellations i,l) = β0 + β1fraction of ps i,l + β2mmsi,l + β3Xi,l + β4Di + β5Dt + ￿i,l
where the dependent variable is the number of submitted interpellations or inquiries in natural
logarithmic terms.15 We include the fraction of public servants elected to parliament in state
i in legislative period l as main explanatory variable. Additional explantory variables include,
mmsi,l, a dummy variable being 1 if a mixed-member electoral system is applied, and Xi,l
capturing the additional determinants identified above. Laender-fixed eﬀects are denoted by Di,
decade-fixed eﬀects by Dt, and ￿i,l is the error term.
Given that our dependent variable is logarithmized, we estimate specifications of a semilogarith-
mic functional form. Accordingly, the coeﬃcient for a continuous variable shows the percentage
change in the untransformed dependent variable per one-unit change in the explanatory fac-
tor. However, this interpretation of the estimated correlation coeﬃcients does not hold for
categorical (dummy) variables. As these coeﬃcients are biased, we also report estimated mean
coeﬃcients (in square brackets) that are consistent, close to the unbiased results, and follow the
interpretation of coeﬃcients for continuous variables (Kennedy 1981).
There are two further general aspects concerning the specifications: First, there might be time-
invariant factors in some Laender that are not captured by our independent variables but that
systematically aﬀect the use of parliamentary control instruments. We take this unobserved
Laender-specific variation into account by including Laender fixed eﬀects in all baseline esti-
mations. Examples for such factors might be a Laender parliament-specific political culture or
simply the size of the legislature that influences the use of the diﬀerent control instruments. Sec-
ond, we control for unmeasured time-specific eﬀects on the use of interpellations and inquiries
that might be correlated with some of the independent variables. For instance, there might be
15If we do not transform the dependent variable, we have a count data setting. The negative
skews of the three diﬀerent dependent variables take values between 1.1 and 2.7 indicating only
a slightly skewed shape. This does not require a model specification approach diﬀerent from
ordinary least squares. In our robustness checks with negative binomial models, we receive
similar results.
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strongly disputed (political) issues in some periods that give rise to interpellations across Laen-
der. Accordingly, we include decade fixed eﬀects in panels II, IV and VI. We are aware that we
ask a lot from the limited pool of data when we include state as well as time fixed eﬀects. We
may end up not rejecting a wrong null hypothesis; i.e. committing a type II error, in particular,
due to the fact that there is common variation across Laender in the fraction of public servants
over time. However, we want to clearly document the limits of our data analysis.
[Table 1 about here]
For all parliamentary control instruments, we find that a higher fraction of public servants is
statistically related to more parliamentary oversight ceteris paribus. With regard to the size
of the partial correlations, a one percentage point increase in the fraction of public servants in
parliament is associated, on average, with a 1.4% increase in the number of major interpellations
submitted (panel I). For minor interpellations, the eﬀect is 7% (panel III) and for oral inquiries,
2.4% respectively (panel V). These results are consistent with the hypothesis of lower individual
control costs of public servants elected to parliament (given the level of political competition).
The baseline estimations are, however, sensitive to the additional inclusion of time-fixed eﬀects.
For major interpellations and oral inquiries, we find that most of the variation that is related to
the fraction of public servants in parliament can also be statistically accounted for by time eﬀects
(as shown in panels II and VI). For minor interpellations, the size of the partial correlations is
also smaller. However, it is still sizeable and statistically significant at the 1% level (panel IV).
For the further explanatory factors, we find the following partial correlations. The variable
capturing a mixed-member electoral system is positively correlated with the execution of par-
liamentary oversight. This points in the theoretically expected direction – the more parliamen-
tarians to be held personally accountable, the more eﬀort is invested in parliamentary oversight.
However, the coeﬃcients have to be interpreted with caution. They are identified based on
changes in the electoral system in only three German Laender. For the margin of victory, we
find the theoretically expected negative sign. The larger the margin of victory is, the less en-
gagement in oversight takes place. Legislatures with at least one new party are found to use
more frequently instruments of parliamentary oversight. At least one new party in parliament is
associated with 24.8% more submitted minor interpellations in panel IV. However, the partial
correlations for the margin of victory as well as for new party are only statistically significant
in the case of minor interpellations. For the number of parties an ambiguous picture emerges
as correlations are positive for major interpellations (not statistically significant) but negative
for minor interpellations and oral inquiries. No clear picture emerges also for the seat share of
the SPD. The existence of a coalition government by major parties is associated with a more
frequent use of all parliamentary instruments. The eﬀects are quantitatively and statistically
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strongest for major interpellations. For the variable capturing constitutional parliaments, no
statistically significant partial correlations are identified once decade fixed eﬀects are included.
However, an interpretation is diﬃcult. With regard to the separate introduction of oral in-
quiries, the partial correlations indicate that there is a substitution eﬀect of oral inquiries for
minor interpellations. The length of the legislative period is statistically significantly related
to the use of parliamentary control instruments. The large negative coeﬃcient for the variable
that captures the shortest legislative periods is due to the fact that all these periods are charac-
terized by interim governments. If we standardize the dependent variable by the length of the
legislative period, qualitatively and quantitatively very similar results are obtained. Together,
the explanatory factors account for 64.9% of the variation in the dependent variable major inter-
prellations, 82.3% in the variable minor interpellations and 49.1% in the variable oral inquiries
when including Laender- and decade-fixed eﬀects. The F-tests indicate that the independent
variables are jointly statistically significant.16
Robustness checks for the baseline estimation
In order to assess the robustness of the results for our main instrument of interest; i.e., minor
interpellations, we execute further empirical checks reported in Table A.5 in the Appendix. As
baseline estimation, we take the specification in Table 1, panel IV including time- and Laender
fixed eﬀects. In a first test (panel I), we check whether alternations in government lead to
more contested legislative periods and thus provoke more engagement in oversight. However, no
statistically significant association is observed. A second test extends the analysis of the form
of government and substitutes the variable capturing coalition government by major parties
with a variable that captures any kind of coalition government (as opposed to single-party
government). Again no systematic statistical relationship with oversight is estimated. As an
alternative measure of party competition, we check whether the Herfindahl concentration index
has an additional eﬀect over the variable capturing the number of parties. This seems not to be
16As a further robustness check, we run the baseline estimations computing robust standard
errors taking into account heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. We found qualitatively
similar results. However, the calculation of robust standard errors traditionally presupposes a
large number of cross-sectional units. This condition is not given in the present analysis since
we only have 16 Laender. (Note though as recent contributions (see e.g., Kezdi 2004) show
that the general robust standard error estimator (introduced to the fixed-eﬀects estimator by
Arellano 1987) also behaves well in finite samples.) Moreover, in our full sample the minimum
number of observations per Land used to compute the disturbance of the covariance matrix
is two for Mecklenburg-Lower-Pomerania and Saxony, and three for the other new German
Laender. This small numerical basis renders the computation of standard errors unreliable and
quite fragile. Due to these two concerns, we follow the conservative approach recommended by
Angrist and Pischke (2009, chapter eight) and take whatever standard errors are larger (robust
or conventional) as our measure of precision.
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the case though. In panel IV, we test whether there are systematic diﬀerences in the engagement
in oversight under governments of diﬀerent ideology. The partial correlation for governments
led by the SPD is statistically not significant. For all these checks, the partial correlation for
our political selection variable is unaﬀected.
Further estimations (not shown) address the argument of a medialization of the parliamentary
process over time. This development might have generated stronger incentives for parliamentary
activism, in particular, by members of the opposition parties overlaying other forces that we
study here. We check the stability of the results by estimating equations based on time series
of increasing length. The results indicate that the eﬀect observed for the fraction of public
servants is stronger during the early legislative periods. For the sample including elections up
to 1990 (N=94), the coeﬃcient is 0.036 (t-value=3.25) and up to 2000, the respective value
is 0.034 (t-value=3.77) compared to a coeﬃcient of 0.027 (t-value=3.15) in the full sample.
In order to further explore unmeasured time-specific eﬀects, we additionally run the same
regressions with increasing length of the time-series including five-year fixed eﬀects instead of
decade fixed eﬀects. For the sample restricted to elections up to 1990, the estimated coeﬃcient
is 0.027 (t-value=2.36) and up to 2000, it is 0.026 (t-value=2.73) as compared to a coeﬃcient of
0.020 (t-value= 2.19) in the full sample. Overall, we observe an attenuation of the theoretically
claimed relationship.
Dynamic bias-corrected panel estimations
In Table 2, we, again, concentrate on the use of minor interpellations. We restrict our analysis to
the old German Laender with longer time series and address two major econometric challenges.
First, dynamics are taken into account in our (short) time-series, (small) cross-sectional data
set. Second, in order to meet concerns regarding endogeneity, we apply an instrumental variable
approach.
[Table 2 about here]
In panels I and II, we estimate dynamic panel models that explicitly include a lagged dependent
variable. We apply the least squares dummy variables estimator for dynamic panel data proposed
by Bruno (2005). This estimator corrects for the small number of cross-sectional units.17 One
possible driver behind a positive correlation of the residuals for consecutive legislative periods
17Nickell (1981) shows that the least squares dummy variables estimator (the common fixed
eﬀects estimator) is not consistent for finite T in dynamic panel data models. A number of con-
sistent estimators, such as Arellano and Bond (1991) and Anderson and Hsiao (1982) have been
proposed as alternatives to the least squares dummy variable estimator. However, the proper-
ties of the proposed estimators hold for large samples (large N) only. Bruno (2005) presents
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is the electoral advantage of incumbents. The average length of stay in German parliaments
is about two and a half periods, see, e.g., Mielke and Reutter (2004). Accordingly, the use
of parliamentary oversight is partially influenced by the inertia of the personal composition of
legislatures and the oversight culture that is carried over.18
As theoretically expected, there is inertia in the use of parliamentary oversight instruments.
According to specification I, the elasticity with regard to the lagged dependent variable is 0.577.
With regard to the political selection variable, the fraction of public servants in parliament is
still positively related to the number of minor interpellations submitted. For a one percentage
point increase, the estimated eﬀect is between 1.2% and 2.6% and thus of an economically
significant size. However, the eﬀect is not statistically significant at conventional levels when
we include decade fixed eﬀects. This might reflect that we demand a lot (or too much) from
the limited data. Another explanation might again be the attenuation over time observed and
discussed above for the baseline estimations. If we apply the bias-corrected dynamic panel
estimator including Laender and decade fixed eﬀects to legislative periods with elections before
1990 (N=94), the coeﬃcient is 0.022 (z-value=1.98), before 1995, the respective value is 0.022
(z-value=2.05) and before 2000, it is 0.020 (z-value=2.33) whereas it is 0.012 (z-value=1.42) in
the full sample. If we further explore the stability of our results for time series of increasing
length and five-year fixed eﬀects instead of decade fixed eﬀects, we find a similar pattern of
attenuation over time. For the sample up to 1990, the coeﬃcient is 0.019 (z-value=1.49), up
to 1995 the respective value is 0.020 (z-value=1.69) and up to 2000 it is 0.017 (z-value=1.85)
compared to 0.008 (z-value=0.93) for all observations in the old Laender.19 In sum, the air gets
thin for any meaningful identification of eﬀects and rejection of hypotheses given the available
data. While the reasons for the statistically observed attenuation have to remain open, the
positive relationship between the representation of public servants and minor interpellations
still seems to be a relevant feature for understanding parliamentary control in Germany at least
in earlier years.
Instrumental variable estimations
a bias-corrected least squares dummy variables estimator for dynamic (unbalanced) panel data
models with a small number of cross-sectional units as it is the case in our empirical model.
Here, the Arellano-Bond estimator is chosen to initialize the bias correction. We undertake 100
repetitions of the procedure to bootstrap the estimated standard errors. The results do neither
change qualitatively with a diﬀerent number of repetitions nor when we choose the Anderson-
Hsiao estimator to initialize the bias correction.
18Since the variable covering constitutional parliaments always coincides with the first obser-
vation in a Laender-time series, it is dropped in the first and second specification.
19Additionally separating a sample for elections up to 2005 is not meaningful as the number
of observations diﬀers only by one completed legislative period compared to the full sample.
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In panels III and IV, we apply an instrumental variable approach to address concerns regarding
endogeneity. This allows for the possibility that a third variable drives the fraction of public
servants in parliament as well as oversight activities and thus generates a spurious correlation
between the two variables. For example, a political scandal may increase voters’ demand for
parliamentary oversight, and simultaneously voters may also elect more public servants as legis-
lators. To allow a consistent estimation, we instrument the fraction of public servants with the
respective institutional determinants that are not themselves explanatory variables for parlia-
mentary oversight. These instruments are taken form Braendle and Stutzer (2010). Braendle and
Stutzer (2010) analyze the selection eﬀects of institutional restrictions and privileges that apply
only to public servants elected to parliament. Examples are the varying degrees in the strictness
of incompatibility rules or privileges, such as special pension benefits, automatic promotion and
the abeyance compensation for being put on leave. These institutions are theoretically as well
as empirically strong predictors of the variation in the representation of public servants in pol-
itics.20 Panels III and IV report the results of the second stage of the two-stage least-squares
estimation without and with decade fixed eﬀects. For IV-estimates, we calculate robust stan-
dard errors taking into account panel heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.21 The fraction
of public servants is again statistically significantly related to a more frequent use of minor in-
terpellations in both panels. For the other political variables, the two econometric refinements
do not change the results qualitatively. For the variable capturing the mixed-member electoral
system, a positive partial correlation is found throughout.
Altogether, we find positive eﬀects of the fraction on public servants as well as the mixed-member
electoral system on the use of minor interpellations. Robustness checks reveal, however, that
the eﬀect of public servants on the use of minor interpellations is driven by variation at the
beginning of our observation period and that there is an attenuation of the eﬀect size (and the
statistical significance) when we include observations after 1990. Regarding the electoral rule,
the eﬀect has to be interpreted with caution as it is identified based on institutional changes
20The result of the first-stage estimation for the instruments for the fraction of public servants
is as follows: -0.076 x strict incompatibility (0.035) + -0.061 x soft incompatibility (0.037) +
0.069 x strict incompatibility x fulltime parliament (0.027) + 0.036 x pension benefit (0.021)
+ 0.084 x abeyance compensation (0.024) + 0.069 x automatic promotion (0.036) + -0.055 x
other privileges (0.023). The results for the further variables in the first stage are as follows:
0.045 x mixed member electoral system (0.031) + 0.001 margin of victory (0.001) + 0.013 new
party (0.008) + 0.006 number of parties (0.009) + 0.002 seat share of the SPD (0.001) + 0.006
coalition government by major parties (0.02) + 0.026 constitutional parliament (0.067) + 0.022
oral inquiries exercisable (0.034). The coeﬃcients for the indicators of the length of the legislative
period as well as for the fixed eﬀects are not reported. The F-statistic of the first-stage regression
is 15.90.
21Excluding the new German Laender alleviates the problem of having too few observations
in one panel in order to reasonably compute the disturbance of the covariance matrix.
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in only three Laender. The margin of victory, the number of parties as well as the seat share
of the SPD are negatively correlated, new parties and coalition governments by major parties
positively related to the submission of minor interpellations.
Ecological fallacy and qualitative evidence on the behavior of public servants in parliament
Our theoretical analysis focuses on individual incentives while our empirical analysis has to rely
on aggregate data. The standard ecological fallacy issue emerges. Knowing about the risk of
misinterpretation of correlations with aggregate data, we, first, carefully studied many alterna-
tive explanations for engagement in parliamentary oversight. In particular, we include a large
number of control variables in order to deal with potentially confounding factors that lead to
spurious correlations.
Second, we oﬀer qualitative individual-level evidence refering to the work by Schrode (1977).
This study is the only previous investigation analyzing the behavior of public servants in par-
liament. Schrode himself attended parliamentary commission sittings (being non-public) and
public plenary debates in the German Laender parliaments of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, Hesse and
Rhineland-Palatinate. He studies the behavior of parliamentarians with a public sector back-
ground as compared to parliamentarians with other professional backgrounds in the plenary
phase. He concludes that these parliamentarians are more active and more critical in comment-
ing and controlling government behavior and that this is especially the case in public service
issues. He also states that the plenary phase mirrors the behavior in the non-public committee
sittings. We take this in-depth qualitative analysis as consistent and supportive of our ag-
gregate evidence on the relationship between the selection of public servants into poltics and
parliamentary oversight.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we propose a framework to integrate the identity of legislators in a politico-
economic analysis of parliamentary oversight. Legislators decide about the eﬀort they invest
in oversight activities depending on their individual control costs and the level of electoral
competition. More parliamentary oversight is expected if the political process selects legislators
with low control costs given the competition in the political market. Identity is thus understood
as heterogeneity in control costs, which is driven by processes of political selection. This approach
suggests that there is an interaction of institutions that shape legislators’ accountability to
oversee the executive branch and institutions that aﬀect the selection of citizens into parliaments.
Our focus is on the political selection of public servants into parliament. In many countries,
there is a debate about dual employment of federal and state legislators (see, e.g., Kerns and
Martel 2008 for the U.S.). In particular, there are two countervailing arguments. On the one
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hand, public servants in parliament dispose of a high degree of expertise in public service issues
and thus have lower individual costs of engaging in monitoring. Facing reelection incentives
and individual accountability, public servants in parliament can serve as a check attenuating
the information asymmetry between the executive and legislative branches of government. On
the other hand, their double role as agents in the public service and as principals that supervise
the public service in parliament generates a conflict of interest compromising their incentives for
parliamentary oversight despite any cost advantage.
Our empirical findings for the German Laender parliaments support the hypothesis of a moni-
toring advantage of public servants. We find that overall a larger fraction of public servants in
parliament is statistically associated with a higher number of submitted minor interpellations
(our theoretically preferred indicator for parliamentary oversight). This holds when taking into
account dynamics in the data as well as instrumenting the fraction of public servants in par-
liament with its institutional determinants. The average eﬀect of public servants on the use
of minor interpellations is thereby driven by variation at the beginning of our observation pe-
riod. Consistent with our aggregate findings is qualitative evidence from an in-depth analysis of
individual-level behavior of public servants during parliamentary debates by Schrode (1977). He
reports that public servants are more active and more critical regarding government behavior
in the parliamentary process than members from other sectors. Moreover, we find a generally
positive level eﬀect of the mixed-member electoral system on the number of submitted par-
liamentary inquiries which is, however, identified based on institutional reforms in only three
Laender. Political competition aﬀects parliamentary control in a diﬀerentiated way. While a
tighter race between the two biggest parties in parliament is related to more interpellations, a
larger number of parties as such is related to less minor interpellations.
Based on our results, we think that it is worthwhile to study explicitly the use of oversight
instruments in order to gain insights into the actual process of parliamentary control. Further
research might address whether there are electoral cycles in the execution of the various control
instruments and if yes, whether they depend on the quality characteristics of the politicians.
Beyond that, the current line of argument could be extended to outcomes of the political process.
Altogether, the insights should provide a better understanding of when policy outcomes are more
the result of political selection or the result of holding politicians accountable, and of when both
mechanisms systematically interact.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Use of Minor Interpellations and Oral Inquiries in German Laender Parliaments
Notes: The legislative periods are numbered backwards in order to obtain comparable time-
series. The 17th legislative period always stands for the latest legislative period. The single
observations are not standardized by the length of the respective legislative periods. The Ham-
burg parliament documentation service does not document the use of oral inquiries separately.
In order to facilitate the comparability of the time-series, we restricted the maximal value to 10
(10.000 submissions of interpellations). This implies that the most recent observation for minor
interpellations in Saxony is indicated with a value of 10 instead of 12,2.
Sources: See Table A.1.
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Appendix
Box A.1: Control Instruments in German Laender Parliaments
Major interpellation
Major interpellations (often called grosse Anfrage or Interpellation) are addressed to the gov-
ernment, are submitted in the form of a detailed written request to the president of the
parliament, and have to be signed by a parliamentary group or by a minimum of five to fifteen
legislators. In some Laender parliaments, one parliamentarian is the main supporter of the
submission. The government is requested to provide a written reply within six weeks. After
a reply is received, the interpellation is placed on the plenary agenda, and if the submitting
group insists, a debate must take place. Prior to a debate, one of the questioners is allowed
to present additional arguments backing the submitted interpellation. After the debate, par-
liamentarians can induce a motion for a resolution to express their opinion on the subject of
the interpellation or the government’s reply to it.
Minor interpellation
Minor interpellations (often called kleine or schriftliche Anfrage) are submitted by individual
legislators in the form of a detailed written request containing up to ten specific questions.
The government is expected to reply to the minor interpellation, in writing, within two weeks.
The answer is published as parliamentary printed matter. If a minor interpellation is not
answered in time, rules of procedure stipulate a transformation into a major interpellation.
Oral inquiry
They are also submitted by individual legislators in the form of a written request containing
up to five specific questions. They must be sent some days before the next plenary debate
takes place (previous notice). Their authors read them out and the government has to give
an oral answer. Follow-up questions are allowed. The author is asked to express his or her
(dis)satisfaction with the answer provided. If oral questions are not answered, the government
has to deliver a written reply; otherwise, it is put forward to a minor interpellation.
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Box A.2: Example of a Minor Interpellation
The example of a minor interpellation is taken from the 4th legislative period of the parliament
of Mecklenburg-Lower-Pomerania. It was executed on November 26, 2003 (parliamentary
printed matter 4/919). The interpellation was submitted by Harry Glawe, a member of
parliament with a public service background.
Topic: Status of employee ill-health in the ministerial administration of Mecklenburg-Lower-
Pomerania
1. The government ministries of Mecklenburg-Lower-Pomerania conduct a very diﬀerent
policy regarding the reporting of employee ill-health statistics. Are there particular rea-
sons?
2. Do flexible vacation days influence the time structure of employee ill-health absences?
Are the absences recorded, and if so, how detailed are the records?
3. How many members of staﬀ are ill for more than six weeks (give as a percentage also)?
Please give detailed information for each ministry. How has the number of absences of
more than six weeks owing to ill-health developed over the past five years?
4. What is the annual average number of ill staﬀ? What is the ratio of annually ill staﬀ to
annual working hours?
5. What criteria does the government apply in appraising the average level of staﬀ ill in
relation to the annual working hours?
6. What criteria does the government apply in appraising a comparison between the diﬀerent
ill-health statistics of the individual ministries?
7. How do these figures compare with parallel government institutions in other German
regions?
Note: The example is not translated literally but with regard to content. See the working
paper version for examples for major interpellations and oral inquiries.
Sources: Parliamentary online documentation services.
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Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics for the Dependent and Independent Variables
Number Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
of LPs
Dependent variables
Major interpellations 152 66.583 53.56 0 237
Minor interpellations 153 1663.634 1723.853 7 12278
Oral inquiries 133 545.871 546.931 3 2499
Continuous independent variables
Fraction of public servants 153 40.481 10.363 10.6 61.6
Margin of victory 153 11.799 8.858 .1 41.5
Number of parties 153 3.706 .924 2 8
Seat share of the SPD 153 40.794 9.806 10.484 62.162
Herfindahl party concentration index 153 39.779 6.627 23.495 54.618
Independent variables coded as dummies
Mixed-member electoral system 153 .739 .441 0 1
New party 153 .333 .473 0 1
Coalition government by major parties 153 .144 .352 0 1
Constitutional parliament 153 .059 .236 0 1
Oral inquiries exercised 153 .346 .477 0 1
Major alternation in government 153 .137 .345 0 1
Coalition government 153 .595 .493 0 1
Government led by the SPD 153 .477 .501 0 1
LP shorter than 1.5 years 153 .033 .178 0 1
LP lasting between 1.5 and 3 years 153 .039 .195 0 1
LP lasting regular 4 years 153 .686 .466 0 1
LP lasting regular 5 years 153 .242 .430 0 1
Notes: LP stands for legislative period. For independent variables that are coded as dummies,
mean values indicate the fraction of observations that have the specific characteristic indicated
by the label of the respective variable. The time series of minor interpellations for Hamburg
also includes the number of oral inquiries submitted. The Hamburg parliament documentation
service does not separately document the use of both instruments. However, the number of
minor interpellation dominates the number of oral inquiries submitted.
Sources: For the dependent variables, see Kalke and Raschke (2004), Mielke and Reutter (2004),
Raschke and Kalke (1994), Reutter (2008), Scha¨fer (2005), and various parliamentary handbooks
and parliamentary documentation systems.
For the independent variables, see Braendle and Stutzer (2010) for the fraction of public servants,
Massicotte (2003) for the coding of the variable electoral system, and Manow and Wettengel
(2006) as well as the German electoral oﬃce (Bundeswahlleiter) for the coding of the form
of government. For the coding of the variable capturing major alternation in government see
Manow and Wettengel (2006) and the German electoral oﬃce (Bundeswahlleiter). For all other
variables, the coding is based on information from the Bundes- or Landeswahlleiter.
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Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics for the Fraction of Public Servants Elected to German
Laender Parliaments
No. of LPs Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Old Laender
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg 13 47.21 9.45 29.00 61.60
Bavaria 15 40.45 9.91 23.80 53.43
Berlin 11 41.26 5.38 30.49 48.85
Bremen 7 37.16 5.31 30.12 45.00
Hamburg 12 33.74 5.06 23.14 41.66
Hesse 17 46.43 8.04 32.50 55.45
Lower Saxony 15 29.04 12.67 10.60 42.58
North Rhine-Westphalia 9 34.51 5.55 21.50 41.50
Rhineland-Palatinate 14 45.34 13.10 24.20 60.00
Saar 7 49.39 8.51 34.00 58.00
Schleswig-Holstein 14 43.34 8.25 24.60 58.10
New Laender
Brandenburg 4 40.84 7.28 31.50 48.90
Meckl.-Lower-Pomerania 3 42.25 6.14 35.21 46.48
Saxony 4 44.45 6.48 35.48 50.80
Saxony-Anhalt 4 32.67 4.57 26.72 37.73
Thuringia 4 33.20 1.63 31.40 35.20
Sum old Laender 134 40.76 10.74 10.6 61.60
Sum new Laender 19 38.50 7.02 26.72 50.80
Sum all Laender 153 40.48 10.36 10.60 61.60
Note: LPs indicates the number of legislative periods.
Sources: Braendle and Stutzer (2010).
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Table A.3: Electoral Rules Applied in the German Laender
Mixed-member system Proportional representation
Old Laender
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg as of LP 1 (1952) never applied to observed periods
Bavaria as of LP 2 (1950) LP 1 (1946-1950)
Berlin applies to all observed periods never applied to observed periods
(as of 1967)
Bremen never applied to observed periods applies to all observed periods
(as of 1971)
Hamburg never applied to observed periods applies to all observed periods
(as of 1970)
Hesse as of LP 3 (1954) LP 1 – LP 2 (1946-1954)
Lower Saxony as of LP 1 (1947) never applied to observed periods
North Rhine- applies to all observed periods never applied to observed periods
Westphalia (as of 1962)
Rhineland-Palatinate as of LP 12 (1991) LP 1 – LP 11 (1947-1991)
Saar never applied to observed periods applies to all observed periods
(1965-1999)
Schleswig-Holstein as of LP 3 (1954) never applied to observed periods
New Laender
Brandenburg as of LP 1 (1990) never applied to observed periods
Meckl.-Lower- applies to all observed periods never applied to observed periods
Pomerania (as of 1994)
Saxony as of LP 1 (1990) never applied to observed periods
Saxony-Anhalt as of LP 1 (1990) never applied to observed periods
Thuringia as of LP 1 (1990) never applied to observed periods
Notes: LP stands for legislative period. The table covers the electoral rules in place for the
legislative periods for which we have the information on the execution of interpellation rights.
Sources: Massicotte (2003) and the German electoral oﬃce (Bundeswahlleiter).
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ti
es
(a
s
op
p
os
ed
to
si
n
gl
e-
p
ar
ty
go
ve
rn
m
en
ts
),
0
ot
h
er
w
is
e.
P
an
el
II
I:
In
cl
u
si
on
of
th
e
va
ri
ab
le
in
d
ic
at
in
g
th
e
H
er
fi
n
d
ah
l
co
n
ce
nt
ra
ti
on
in
d
ex
fo
r
p
ar
ti
es
in
st
ea
d
of
th
e
va
ri
ab
le
“C
oa
li
ti
on
go
ve
rn
m
en
t
by
m
a
jo
r
p
ar
ti
es
”.
A
h
ig
h
er
va
lu
e
of
th
e
in
d
ex
si
gn
ifi
es
m
or
e
p
ar
ty
co
n
ce
nt
ra
ti
on
.
P
an
el
IV
:
In
cl
u
si
on
of
th
e
va
ri
ab
le
“G
ov
er
n
m
en
t
le
d
by
th
e
S
P
D
”.
T
h
is
va
ri
ab
le
is
co
d
ed
1
if
th
e
S
oc
ia
l
D
em
oc
ra
ti
c
P
ar
ty
is
th
e
si
n
gl
e
p
ar
ty
or
th
e
se
n
io
r
p
ar
tn
er
in
p
ar
ty
co
al
it
io
n
s
su
st
ai
n
in
g
th
e
go
ve
rn
m
en
t.
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